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Abstract
Informal risk sharing within social networks and formal financial contracts both
enable households to manage risk. We find that financial contracting reduces
participation in social networks. Specifically, increased crop insurance usage
decreased local religious adherence and congregation membership in agricultural
communities. Our identification utilizes the Federal Crop Insurance Reform Act of
1994 that doubled crop insurance usage nationally within a year, although changes in
usage varied across counties. Difference-in-Difference and Spatial First Difference
tests confirm that households substituted insurance for religiosity. This substitution
was associated with reductions in crop diversification and crop yields, indicating an
increase in moral hazard.
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I

Introduction
How do households manage income risk? This question is not only central to

modern finance but also to society at large. Traditionally, households relied on social
networks, typically within their local communities or extended family, to navigate difficult
times. However, does the relatively recent use of financial contracts to manage risk affect
household participation in social networks? We examine this question by testing whether
the increased use of crop insurance reduced religious activities in agricultural communities.
Our research question is motivated by Rajan (2019)’s description of how financial
markets, in conjunction with governments, have encroached on activities that once
reinforced community bonds. This encroachment may explain why the role of finance in
society is so contentious (Zingales (2015)). Therefore, besides contributing to the literature
on household risk management, our results also contribute to policy debates regarding the
role of government and finance in society.
An existing literature documents that risk pooling within social networks enables
households to manage the consumption risk associated with income shocks (Ambrus et al.
(2014), Mobarak and Rosenzweig (2013), Fafchamps and Gubert (2007), Townsend
(1994)). Within agricultural communities, the farmers’ cooperative functions as an informal
credit market by financing the consumption of farmers experiencing a poor harvest and
delaying their payments (Kimball (1988)). The church also provides a social network
capable of facilitating risk sharing since Iannaccone (1992) argues that churches mitigate
adverse selection through prohibitions, rituals, and other commitments. The monitoring
and information sharing needed to ensure compliance with these commitments enables
churches to also mitigate moral hazard and enforce risk-sharing agreements.1 Therefore,
1

Enforcement can involve suspending access to the risk-sharing agreement for members that exert insufficient effort, commit inadequate resources, or fail to reciprocate. The podcast Creating God on National
Public Radio’s Hidden Brain summarizes the ability of religious institutions to enforce contracts.
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the ability of religiosity to facilitate risk sharing does not require direct cash transfers from
religious institutions to households.
Moreover, empirical evidence has specifically found that social networks defined by
religiosity enhance risk sharing. Chen (2010) reports that religiosity alleviates the financial
constraints of households and smooths their consumption, while Ager et al. (2016) report
that church membership provided informal insurance in the aftermath of a natural disaster.
While Ager and Ciccone (2018) find a positive relation between religiosity and agricultural
risk, our contribution is determining whether the use of a financial contract to manage
household risk displaces social networks that have traditionally facilitated informal risk
sharing.
To study the risk management decisions of households, we examine the use of crop
insurance for six major field crops (corn, soybeans, wheat, oats, barley, and sorghum). Of
the 2 million farms in the United States, 98% are family farms.2 In response to the Great
Flood of 1993, the Federal Crop Insurance Reform Act (FCIRA) of 1994 dramatically
increased subsidies for crop insurance to encourage farmers to purchase crop insurance
instead of relying on federal disaster assistance. This legislation doubled the aggregate use
of crop insurance from 35% of field crop production in 1994 to 77% in 1995. However, as
illustrated in Figure 1, changes in the use of this financial contract varied substantially
across counties.
Our substitution hypothesis posits that financial contracts to manage household risk
are a substitute for religious adherence. Specifically, we predict that the increased use of
crop insurance decreased religious adherence in agricultural communities. The data
supports our substitution hypothesis. We find an inverse county-level relation between
increases in crop insurance usage and decreases in religious adherence that is more salient
2

United States Department of Agriculture’s National Agricultural Statistics Service. Small family farms
(less than $350,000 in annual gross income) account for 90% of all U.S. farms.
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in counties where agricultural risk is higher. Difference-in-difference methodologies that
exploit cross-sectional variation across counties and time-series variation before versus after
the FCIRA of 1994 confirm our substitution hypothesis. The control groups underlying
these methodologies are defined by urban counties and rural counties with unsuitable
terrain for cultivating field crops as well as religious counties that experienced small
increases in crop insurance usage following the FCIRA.
As the FCIRA of 1994 did not directly target religious activities, reverse causality is
unlikely to confound our empirical support for the substitution hypothesis. Furthermore,
prevailing trends in religiosity before the FCIRA cannot explain our empirical support for
the substitution hypothesis since religious adherence was trending upward, instead of
downward, before this legislation. In addition, there were no confounding government
programs that would have otherwise financed the consumption of farmers or increased their
income.
Furthermore, we use the spatial first difference (SFD) method of Druckenmiller and
Hsiang (2018) that compares neighboring counties to account for omitted variables.
Neighboring counties may be culturally similar but have different exposures to agricultural
risk and therefore different responses to the FCIRA of 1994. The results from the SFD
estimation confirm that the increased use of crop insurance decreased religious adherence.
Church donations are able to capture changes in religiosity that occur before
individuals declare themselves to be non-adherents on the next census. Using annual data
on church donations, a difference-in-difference methodology confirms that church donations
decreased more in rural counties after 1994 than in urban counties. The finding is
consistent with Auriol et al. (2020)’s conclusion that donations to religious institutions
have an insurance motive.
We also find that crop insurance displaced precautionary savings in the form of
bank deposits. This finding confirms the importance of crop insurance to household risk
4

management and indicates that our support for the substitution hypothesis is unlikely to
be spurious. While precautionary savings is a response to agricultural risk, crop
diversification is a determinant of agricultural risk. We find that the increased use of crop
insurance usage reduced crop diversification, especially in counties where religious
adherence experienced a large decline, and also reduced crop yields. Thus, consistent with
an increase in moral hazard, the reduction in crop diversification increased agricultural risk
without increasing productivity. Intuitively, religious adherence enables risk-sharing
agreements to mitigate moral hazard by facilitating monitoring and information sharing.
Consequently, the displacement of risk-sharing agreements by government-subsidized
financial contracts that reduce income risk can increase moral hazard. This conclusion is
consistent with Wei and Zhang (2021)’s finding that the introduction of a
government-funded pension in rural China reduced agricultural effort.
In summary, our results indicate that household participation in social networks is
dependent on a cost-benefit analysis. Specifically, consistent with our substitution
hypothesis, reductions in the cost of using a financial contract to manage household risk
reduce participation in social networks that facilitate risk sharing. While prior empirical
evidence finds that social networks impact financial outcomes (Hirshleifer (2015), Heimer
(2016)), we study the impact of finance on social networks. For example, Hong et al. (2004)
find that church attendance influences participation in the stock market. Conversely, we
find that the use of financial contracting alters church attendance. By examining the
broader implications of finance for society, our contribution parallels Engelberg and
Parsons (2016)’s study regarding the impact of financial markets on investor health.
For emphasis, the implications of our study are not limited to social networks based
on religious adherence. However, social networks that require less commitment such as
recreational sports clubs are less effective at facilitating risk sharing. Therefore, the impact
of insurance usage on low-commitment social networks is likely to be less salient. The
5

implications of our study are also not limited to instances where government subsidies
lower the cost of financial contracting since several FinTech applications are attempting to
lower the cost of using financial contracts to manage household risk.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the related
literature and develops our substitution hypothesis. Section III describes our data. Section
IV provides our empirical support for the substitution hypothesis, while Section V reports
on its economic consequences. Section VI then concludes.

II

Literature Review and Empirical Hypothesis
As family farms are primarily responsible for the production of field crops, the use

of crop insurance by farmers producing these crops provides an ideal setting for studying
household risk management. To manage their exposure to agricultural risk, households can
either (i) participate in an informal risk-sharing agreement facilitated by their religious
adherence, or (ii) purchase a financial contract in the form of crop insurance.

A

Informal Risk-Sharing Agreements
Social networks provide households with access to informal risk-sharing agreements

(Ambrus et al. (2014), Fafchamps and Gubert (2007), and Ligon et al. (2002)). Although
the empirical literature on informal risk sharing within agricultural communities often
studies kinship networks in developing countries (Townsend (1994), Kinnan and Townsend
(2012)), Kranton (1996) demonstrates that reciprocity is self-sustaining in developed
economies with cash-based markets. Moreover, besides kinship, social networks based on
religious adherence also facilitate risk sharing. Putnam and Campbell (2010) report that a
common religious background increases trust, which is crucial for risk sharing according to
Karlan et al. (2009). Gurun et al. (2018) also document that trust among religious
6

adherents facilitates financial intermediation.3 Furthermore, Putnam (2000) reports that
religious adherence facilitates risk sharing by enhancing reciprocity, while Berman (2000)
reports that religious adherence facilitates risk sharing by signaling commitment.
While Mobarak and Rosenzweig (2013) report that informal risk sharing mitigates
the demand for insurance in India, their study is not motivated by a cost-benefit analysis
that determines household participation in risk-sharing agreements. In contrast, our study
identifies reductions in participation arising from a reduction in the cost of insurance.
Binzel et al. (2013) find that access to banking displaced informal risk sharing in India.
While the banking system may facilitate the accumulation of precautionary savings, access
to banking is not a substitute for risk sharing.
Finally, although agricultural risk has a systematic component, the consumption of
farmers experiencing a poor harvest can be supported by other congregation member
whose incomes are not derived from agricultural production. Thus, informal risk-sharing
agreements in agricultural communities can diversify agricultural risk across different
occupations. Nevertheless, the agricultural risk borne by an informal risk-sharing
agreement increases with agricultural production. Therefore, we use the proportion of a
county’s land area cultivated with field crops as a proxy for agricultural risk.

B

Crop Insurance
Private insurance companies sell crop insurance to farmers. Each crop insurance

policy and corresponding premium are subject to approval by the Federal Crop Insurance
Corporation before being underwritten by the United States Department of Agriculture’s
Risk Management Agency (Glauber (2004)).
While a futures contract enables the price risk of specific field crops to be hedged,
3

FinTech applications also require costly mechanisms to build and maintain trust. For example, Budish
(2018) and Abadi and Brunnermeier (2018) examine the cost associated with decentralized blockchains.

7

crop insurance enables farmers to hedge their idiosyncratic output risk. In contrast to
disaster assistance, which resulted from an uncertain political process and was a response
to systematic output reductions caused by natural disasters, crop insurance offers more
complete coverage against idiosyncratic as well as systematic output reductions.
Crop insurance began in 1938 with the Federal Crop Insurance Act. However, the
use of this financial contract was negligible until subsidies were introduced by the Federal
Crop Insurance Act of 1980. Nevertheless, the low use of crop insurance during the 1980s
necessitated government disaster assistance when large floods occurred. However, the
Great Flood of 1993 was a critical event for crop insurance. Rainfall in the summer of 1992
lead to above-normal reservoir levels in the Missouri and Upper Mississippi River basins.
As rain persisted into 1993, soils in the region were completely saturated by June and
subsequent rain resulted in severe flooding throughout the Midwest that caused
approximately $15 billion in damage.
In response to the Great Flood of 1993, Congress passed the Federal Crop Insurance
Reform Act (FCIRA) of 1994 that increased subsidies for crop insurance. This legislation
also authorized a catastrophic loss policy that was completely subsidized by the
government, except for a small administrative fee. The FCIRA doubled the use of crop
insurance from 100 million acres in 1994 to more than 220 million acres in 1995. Before
government subsidies, the total amount of crop insurance premiums paid by farmers
increased by 63% from $949 million in 1994 to over $1.55 billion in 1995. However, as
government subsidies increased nearly 250% from $255 million to $889 million, the total
out-of-pocket cost farmers paid to purchase crop insurance in 1995 was similar to 1994.
The increase in crop insurance usage induced by the FCIRA of 1994 lowered the
income risk of farmers. Across all agricultural counties, normalized income volatility
declined from 0.245 to 0.191.4 This difference has a corresponding t-statistic of 28.73. A
4

We compute normalized income volatility as the standard deviation of a county’s annual average income
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larger difference of 0.072 (t-statistic of 26.88) is found in agricultural counties with poor
soil where normalized income volatility declined from 0.250 to 0.178. The role of soil
quality in determining agricultural risk is described in the next section.
Figure 1 illustrates the variation across county-level changes in crop insurance usage
between 1994 and 1995. Consistent with adverse selection, crop insurance usage increased
more in counties with higher agricultural risk. However, as crop insurance usage was
already higher in these counties before the FCIRA of 1994, only 10% of the variation across
county-level changes in crop insurance is explained by agricultural risk.
Overall, the exogenous reduction in the cost of crop insurance attributable to the
FCIRA of 1994 is the cornerstone of our identification strategy since this legislation
originated with a natural disaster and was not intended to alter religiosity. In particular,
government subsidies for crop insurance did not alter the pecuniary or non-pecuniary cost
of religious adherence.5

C

Substitution Hypothesis
Our testable hypothesis involves the impact of crop insurance on religious adherence

since this financial contract is designed specifically to mitigate agricultural risk.
Substitution Hypothesis: The use of crop insurance reduces the religiosity of
households exposed to agricultural risk.
The substitution hypothesis is motivated by the following illustrative model that
parallels Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975). To formalize the role of religious adherence as a risk
management mechanism, the illustrative model assumes utility U (ci , ri , zi ) is a function of
three components: consumption, a psychological benefit from religious participation, and
from 1980 to 1994 (1995 to 2010) divided by the county’s average income during this period.
5
Gruber and Hungerman (2008) document the non-pecuniary cost of religious adherence as the repeal
of Sunday shopping prohibitions lowered church attendance. The repeal of these state laws occurred more
than a decade before the FCIRA of 1994.
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leisure that decreases with religious participation. The one-period model examines the
religious participation of an household whose consumption differs across two states; good
and bad.
In the good state, which occurs with probability 1 − λ, consumption equals 1 − p.
This amount normalizes consumption to one unit minus an “insurance premium” p that
insures against the poor state. In the bad state, which occurs with probability λ,
consumption is reduced to m =

p (1−λ)
.
λ

The amount m equates the expected cost of

insurance p (1 − λ) in the good state with its expected benefit λ m in the bad state,
assuming consumption would be zero in the bad state without insurance. The
state-dependence of consumption is summarized as
State

Probability

Consumption

Bad

λ

m

1−λ

1−p

Good

The amount p represents lost consumption in the good state that is transferred to those
experiencing the bad state. The psychological benefit of religion is a function of religiosity
ri expressed in units of time. This benefit is constant across the two states and equals the
amount of time household i spent participating in religious activities. Conversely,
household i benefits from leisure time zi , which decreases with the time spent participating
in religious activities due to the following time constraint that is normalized to 1

(1)

zi + ri = 1 .

Following Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975), the utility from consumption, ci , and religious
participation, ri , are not additively separable, while leisure, zi , enters the utility function
linearly to supplement consumption. Specifically, α is an exogenous parameter that
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captures the utility from leisure and is identical for all households. The resulting utility
function equals

(2)

U (ci , ri , zi ) = ln (ci + ri ) + α zi ,

implying that expected utility equals

(3)

E [U (p, ri )] = (1 − λ) ln (1 − p + ri ) + λ ln (m + ri ) + α (1 − ri )


p (1 − λ)
+ ri + α (1 − ri ) .
= (1 − λ) ln (1 − p + ri ) + λ ln
λ

This expected utility has a first order condition with respect to p equaling

(4)

∂E[U ]
= 0 ⇒ p∗ = λ ,
∂p

which implies the optimal insurance premium p∗ increases with risk, λ. Moreover, religious
participation also increases with risk, as the first-order condition for equation (3) with
respect to ri

(5)

1
∂E[U ]
= 0 ⇒ ri ∗ = + λ + 1 ,
∂ri
α

has two implications:
1. Religious participation ri ∗ increases with risk, λ.
2. Religious participation ri ∗ decreases with a greater preference for leisure, α.
To formalize the substitution hypothesis, allow λ to be a function of financial contracting
denoted κ, λ = f (κ, Risk), as well as aggregate Risk that includes soil conditions,
agricultural intensity, and other county-level factors. With financial contracting lowering
11

risk
∂λ
< 0,
∂κ
equation (5) implies that optimal religious participation ri ∗ declines with financial
contracting
∂ri ∗
∂ri ∗ ∂λ
=
< 0.
∂κ
∂λ ∂κ
Thus, the increased adoption of crop insurance is predicted to lower religious adherence.
Besides access to an informal risk-sharing agreement, other benefits of religious
adherence such as access to education weaken empirical support for our substitution
hypothesis since crop insurance is not a substitute for these benefits. Furthermore, our
substitution hypothesis is distinct from the substitution between government expenditures
and church expenditures on social assistance that directly finance the consumption of low
income households (Hungerman (2005), Gruber and Hungerman (2007)). In our
identification, the government decreases the cost of using a financial contract to manage
household risk without increasing household income.6 Nevertheless, we control for income
in our empirical tests and obtain similar results in counties whose average incomes were
stable before and after the FCIRA of 1994.
6

This distinction is important since several FinTech applications are attempting to lower the cost of
using financial contracts to manage household risk. FinTech is also conditioning on soft information from
social media that previously was privy to members of social networks, thereby reducing the informational
advantage of social networks that function as informal credit markets.
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III

Data
The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) provides annual data on the

total acreage of each county that is cultivated with field crops. The Risk Management
Agency at the USDA provides annual data on the total acreage of each county that is
cultivated with field crops and covered by crop insurance.
For each county, we compute agricultural intensity (Agriculture) as the proportion
of a county’s total acreage that is cultivated with field crops.7 Throughout the remainder of
the paper, agricultural counties refer to counties whose agricultural intensity (Agriculture)
is above the national median. The use of financial contracting to manage agricultural risk
(Finance) is computed as the proportion of a county’s acreage cultivated with field crops
that is covered by crop insurance. Both Agriculture and Finance are constructed annually.
Besides Agriculture, we measure agricultural risk using a county-level proxy for soil
quality, Available Water Storage (AWS), from the National Cooperative Soil Survey at the
USDA’s Natural Resources Conservation Service. AWS refers to the quantity of water that
is capable of being stored to a depth of 25 centimeters by accounting for a variety of
different soil characteristics such as its density, mineral composition, etc. The capacity for
water storage is measured in centimeters of water per centimeter of soil. Soil with high
water retention can withstand greater variation in precipitation. Thus, good soil with a
high AWS is associated with lower agricultural risk since this soil is able to self-insure the
production of field crops against a deficit or surplus of water. Unreported results confirm
that crop yields are higher in counties with better soil, while the volatility of crop yields and
therefore agricultural incomes are lower. Consequently, interventions such as crop selection,
7

As a proxy for agricultural intensity, the percentage of a county’s area cultivated with field crops from
the U.S. Department of Agriculture is more relevant than the fraction of agricultural employment from the
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics since agricultural employment is broadly defined to include employment in
alternative types of agriculture, such as ranching. Nevertheless, rural counties with these alternative types
of agriculture are included in the control group of a later difference-in-difference test.
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irrigation, and drainage are unable to overcome poor soil.8 Furthermore, crop insurance
payout rates and premiums are not used to measure agricultural risk since both these
variables are confounded by moral hazard as well as the subsidies and reinsurance provided
by the federal government (Horowitz and Lichtenberg (1993), Roberts et al. (2006)).
County-level religion and population data are obtained from the United States
Census. The number of religious adherents and the number of church congregations for
each Christian religion are available every decade for 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2010. The
census measures participation and not simply a belief in a religion as all adherents of a
Christian religion are required to be members of a Christian church congregation. However,
our results are robust to the inclusion of non-Christian religions that have relatively few
adherents in agricultural counties.
Religious adherence is computed by dividing the total number of Christian
adherents in a county by the county’s total population. Thus, any outward migration of
non-religious residents from agricultural counties increases rather than decreases religious
adherence. An alternative metric for religiosity is the average size of church congregations.
This alternative metric accounts for differences across Christian denominations, and is
robust to the inward migration of non-religious residents. Appendix A describes the main
variables used in our empirical tests.
Each county is identified by its five-digit FIPS code. During the 1980 to 2010
sample period, Table 1 contains summary statistics for the variables involved in testing the
substitution hypothesis. The summary statistics highlight the significant variation across
counties in field crop production, the use of crop insurance, agricultural risk, and the
proportion of the population that adheres to a Christian religion as well as the average
8

To clarify, Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) involve either herbicide-tolerant or pest-tolerant
field crops but GMO crops are not tolerant of poor soil. More important, by reducing risk, the adoption of
GMOs is expected to decrease the use of crop insurance, which Figure 1 indicates is not observed in the vast
majority of counties following the FCIRA of 1994.
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membership of Christian congregations. Table 1 reports that the average county has 24%
of its land under cultivation by field crops, 56% of its population being a Christian
adherent, and 81 church congregations with the average congregation having 306 members.

IV

Empirical Results
This section reports empirical support for the substitution hypothesis. Before

examining this hypothesis, we first provide evidence of a positive association between
religious adherence and agricultural risk within U.S. agricultural communities. This
preliminary evidence extends the existing literature that documents the prevalence of
informal risk-sharing agreements in developing countries.

A

Religious Adherence and Agricultural Risk
According to Figure 2, for counties in the lowest decile of agricultural intensity

(Agriculture), 49% of the population are religious adherents compared to 65% for counties
in the highest decile of agricultural intensity. The positive relation between the level of
religious adherence and agricultural intensity in a county is nearly monotonic.
More formally, we estimate the following panel regression with county-year
observations

(6)

Adherencei,t = β1 Agriculturei,t + γ Xi,t + i,t ,

using 1990 and 2000 census data to conform with our later results for the substitution
hypothesis. Year fixed effects are included to absorb any trend in religiosity across the
United States. County fixed effects are also included to account for variation in Adherence
across counties and determine whether changes in agricultural activity induce changes in
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religious adherence. Standard errors are clustered by county. The control variables in X
represent the following county characteristics: population and per capita income as well as
the percentage of the population that is college educated, foreign born, married, and
African American since these demographic variables may be correlated with religious
adherence and agricultural production. A later analysis focuses on the average age of
residents in each county, and the impact of the FCIRA on demographic characteristics such
as age across counties.
The results in Panel A of Table 2 indicate that religious adherence is higher in
counties with greater agricultural production. In the first column, results are presented
without including any county-level control variables. In the second column, county-level
control variables are included. We find a consistently positive relation between changes in
religious adherence and agricultural activity as the β1 coefficient for Agriculture is
statistically significant at the 1%-level across both specifications. In particular, the
statistical significance of the β1 coefficient does not attenuate as control variables are
added. Instead, the point estimate for Agriculture only declines slightly from 0.541 to
0.477. For the more conservative estimate, a one standard deviation increase in agriculture
(25%) leads to a 11.9% (= 25% × 0.477) increase in religious adherence. With religious
adherence averaging 56%, this increase in religious adherence is economically significant.
Consequently, informal risk sharing within agricultural communities is not limited to
kinship networks in developing countries but also pertains to social networks based on
religious adherence in the United States.
In addition, the positive relation between changes in agricultural activity and
religious adherence is limited to counties with poor soil where agricultural risk is higher.
Specifically, the β1 coefficient equals 0.624 in counties with poor soil and is statistically
significant at the 1%-level, compared to the statistically insignificant 0.099 coefficient in
counties with good soil. Variation in the relation between agricultural risk and religious
16

adherence due to soil quality is invoked in our subsequent test of the substitution
hypothesis.
As religious adherence varies substantially across counties, the inclusion of county
fixed effects results in the standard R-squared measure being near 1. To examine
time-series variation in religious adherence, we also report a time series R-squared measure
that is obtained by regressing religious adherence on county fixed effects in the first stage,
then using the residuals from this regression as dependent variables in a second stage. The
R-squared from the second stage represents the time series R-squared, which captures
time-series variation in religious adherence that is explained by the panel regression
specification.
We also examine the composition of religious adherents based on the strictness of
their denomination. Strict denominations are likely to be more effective at mitigating
adverse selection (Iannaccone (1994)) and consequently at facilitating risk sharing. Strict
religious denominations include the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints,
Evangelicals, Seventh-Day Adventists, and Southern Baptists. We construct a county-level
strictness ratio defined as the number of adherents in strict Christian denominations
divided by the total number of Christian adherents. Consistent with the need for great risk
sharing, agricultural counties with poor soil have nearly 55% more adherents from strict
denominations compared to those with good soil. Specifically, the percentage of strict
adherents in counties with poor soil is 34% versus 22% in counties with good soil. This
12% difference is significant at the 1%-level (t-statistic of 56.48). Thus, agricultural risk
influences the strictness of the social contract that binds religious adherents.
Overall, consistent with Ager and Ciccone (2018)’s finding that households use
religious adherence to mitigate agricultural risk, changes in agricultural activity are
positively associated with changes in religious adherence.

17

B

Substitution Hypothesis
The substitution hypothesis posits that lowering the cost of crop insurance displaces

religiosity as a mechanism to manage household risk. In the panel regression below, the
dependent variable Adherence is computed by dividing the total number of Christian
adherents in a county by the county’s total population. Finance is the independent
variable of primary interest and is computed as the proportion of acreage cultivated by
field crops in a county that is covered by crop insurance.

(7)

Adherencei,t = β1 Financei,t + β2 Agriculturei,t + γ Xi,t + i,t .

We include county fixed effects to account for unobserved political, social, and economic
conditions that differ across counties, and year fixed effects to control for time-series
variation in religious adherence at the national level. With both county and year fixed
effects, we identify the impact of time-series variation in crop insurance on religious
adherence at the county level. This panel regression is estimated using 1990 and 2000
census data, since the FCIRA of 1994 was implemented between these census dates.
Panel A of Table 3 reports the results from equation (7). In the first column, we
include county fixed effects and year fixed effects, while Agriculture is included in the
second column. In the third column, an extensive set of time-varying county characteristics
are included as control variables.
In support of the substitution hypothesis, the evidence in Table 3 reveals an
economically and statistically significant inverse relation between crop insurance usage and
religious adherence. First, the point estimate for Finance is statistically significant at the
1%-level across all specifications. The significance level does not attenuate with the
addition of control variables. Second, the point estimate for Finance is consistently
negative, ranging from −0.044 to −0.128 across the different specifications.
18

Financial contracting is not limited to exerting a contemporaneous impact on social
contracting. Appendix B details the results from a distributed lags model that extends
equation (7) by including lagged values of Finance. The results in the appendix are
consistent with financial contracting exerting a contemporaneous and delayed impact on
social contracting for up to four years. This finding suggests a gradual substitution away
from informal risk-sharing.
To understand the economic impact of financial contracting on religious adherence,
the point estimate of −0.044 implies that if crop insurance usage increases from 40% to
80% of the acreage under cultivation by field crops, religious adherence decreases by
−1.76%. For comparison, the average county-level change in religious adherence equals
−4.92% over the entire 1980 to 2010 period. Thus, the increased use of financial
contracting during the 1990s accounts for an economically significant portion of the total
decline in religiosity during our four-decade long sample period.
For counties with poor soil, where agricultural risk and religious adherence are both
higher according to Figure 2, the substitution effect is predicted to be stronger. Consistent
with this prediction, the results in Panel A of Table 3 indicate that the displacement of
religiosity by crop insurance is concentrated in agricultural counties with higher
agricultural risk. Specifically, in counties with poor soil, the β1 coefficient for Finance is
−0.047 and statistically significant at the 1%-level. Conversely, for counties with good soil,
the β1 coefficient is near zero and statistically insignificant.
These results in Panel B of Table 3 arise from redefining agricultural intensity, hence
agricultural risk, as the percentage of employment in a county that is involved in farming.
However, using this alternative measure of agricultural intensity, Farm Employment, does
not change our empirical support for the substitution hypothesis since the β1 coefficients
for Finance remain negative. Therefore, for the remainder of the paper, we continue to
condition on Agriculture instead of Farm Employment as our proxy for agricultural
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intensity since employment in farming includes ranching and other types of agriculture.
Our results likely underestimate the impact of financial contracting on social
networks for two reasons. First, participation in a church congregation is continuous rather
than binary. For example, an individual’s religious commitment can decline over an
extended period of time before the individual declares herself to be a non-adherent. This
decline is not captured by our current measure of religious adherence but is addressed in a
later analysis of church donations. Second, any migration of non-adherents from
agricultural counties to metropolitan counties increases the religious adherence of
agricultural counties. The outward migration of non-adherents is addressed by our next
analysis involving the membership of church congregations. Unlike religious adherence, the
size of church congregations is not impacted by the outward migration of non-adherents
from rural counties.
The average age of rural counties increased by 2.3 years during our sample period
compared to an increase of 2.5 years in urban counties. Specifically, in rural counties, the
average age was 36.0 years in the pre-FCIRA period from 1980 to 1994 and 38.3 years in
the post-FCIRA period from 1995 to 2010. In urban counties, the average age was 35.3
years in the pre-FCIRA period and 37.8 years in the post-FCIRA period. Thus, although
rural counties were generally older, the trend toward an aging population is more
pronounced in urban counties. A later analysis confirms that rural counties age slower
post-FCIRA and experience a decline in population. While the greater aging of urban
counties relative to rural counties may have several causes (such as longer life expectancy),
this result does not provide direct evidence that the migration of young people from rural
to urban counties is responsible for the decline in religiosity documented in Table 3.
Indeed, a later analysis confirms that adding age to the county-level characteristics
controlled for in equation (7) does not alter our support for the substitution hypothesis.
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C

Church Congregations
The number of members in a church congregation can proxy for the size of the risk

pool underlying an informal risk-sharing agreement. In particular, risk sharing can occur
across all religious adherents in a county or more narrowly within individual church
congregations where monitoring and information sharing are likely to be greater.
Panel C of Table 3 reports results with Number of Congregation Members (in logs)
as the dependent variable in equation (7). This dependent variable is defined as the
number of Christian adherents in a county divided by the number of Christian
congregations in the county. The β1 coefficient for Finance remains negative and
statistically significant at the 1%-level, indicating that the increased use of crop insurance
is associated with a decrease in the average size of church congregations (fewer members
per congregation). In addition, the positive β2 coefficient for Agriculture indicates that
congregations are larger in counties with higher agricultural risk. This positive relation is
consistent with the need for larger risk pools in counties with higher agricultural risk.
We also examine the number of church congregations to address the possibility that
the reduction in average congregation size was caused by an increase in the number of
congregations. This analysis has Number of Congregations (in logs) as the dependent
variable in equation (7). In contrast to Number of Congregation Members, the β1 coefficient
for Finance is close to zero and statistically insignificant for Number of Congregations.
Overall, the results in Panel C of Table 3 indicate that the increased use of crop
insurance decreased the average size of church congregations but not the number of
congregations. More formally, crop insurance usage induced change at the intensive margin
(number of members per congregation) but not at the extensive margin (number of
congregations). This combined evidence indicates that crop insurance reduced the size of
risk pools underlying informal risk-sharing agreements within church congregations.
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D

Difference-in-Difference Methodologies
The previous panel regressions contain county fixed effects to account for variation

in county-level characteristics and year fixed effects to account for time-series variation at
the national level. The impact of crop insurance on religiosity we document is primarily
from changes in crop insurance usage attributable to the FCIRA of 1994 that vary across
counties.
To further address the issue of omitted variables, we use a difference-in-difference
methodology that compares the disparate implications of the FCIRA across counties. This
methodology conditions on time-series variation before versus after the FCIRA of 1994,
and initially conditions on cross-sectional variation across urban versus rural counties. Our
initial assumption is that since urban counties have little agricultural production, urban
counties are less affected by the FCIRA than rural counties. Thus, urban and rural
counties serve as the control and treatment group, respectively. We then create an
interaction term defined as the product of the post-FCIRA indicator and the treatment
(non-urban) indicator, Treated Counties × Post-FCIRA. This variable identifies
county-year observations involving rural counties during the post-1995 subperiod. We then
estimate difference-in-difference tests based on the following specifications

(8) Adherencei,t = β Agriculturei,t + δ Treated Countiesi × Post-FCIRAi,t + γ Xi,t + i,t ,

(9)

Financei,t = β Agriculturei,t + δ Treated Countiesi × Post-FCIRAi,t + γ Xi,t + i,t .

These specifications include county and year fixed effects as well as county characteristics.
To account for any pre-trend or post-trend in religious adherence before and after the
FCIRA of 1994, respectively, we examine census data in 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2010. Urban
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counties are first defined as those where the fraction of total land area under cultivation by
field crops (Agriculture) is below a threshold, which is specified as either 1%, 2%, or 5%.
According to Panel A of Table 4, the negative δ coefficient in equation (8) for the
Treated Counties × Post-FCIRA variable equals -0.020 when religious adherence is the
dependent variable and urban counties are defined using the 1%-threshold for Agriculture.
This decrease in religious adherence is accompanied by a positive δ coefficient of 0.069 for
the treatment variable in equation (9) when crop insurance usage (Finance) is the
dependent variable. Both these coefficients are significant at the 1%-level. Therefore, after
the FCIRA of 1994, rural counties experienced a significantly larger decrease in religious
adherence, and a significantly larger increase in crop insurance usage, compared to urban
counties. These combined results support our substitution hypothesis.
To further identify counties that are less affected by crop insurance, we use U.S.
Census data on the percentage of a county’s land area that is urban. Rural counties are
those that have 1% or less of their land area classified as urban. This pre-selection classifies
51.5% of counties as rural before their exposure to field crop production is identified using
the 1%, 2%, and 5% thresholds for Agriculture. Rural counties in the control group, which
have negligible field crop production, may instead be involved in natural resource
extraction, ranching, or other economic activities such as tourism. We then repeat the
above difference-in-difference methodology in equations (8) and (9), with the results
reported in Panel B of Table 4. These results continue to support our substitution
hypothesis and parallel those in Panel A without the pre-selection of rural counties using
U.S. Census data.
We then replace the Agriculture thresholds with county-level terrain data to identify
the agricultural risk associated with field crop production in rural counties. For this
difference-in-difference implementation, rural counties with mountainous terrain form the
control group. We collect terrain data from the Distributed Active Archive Center at The
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Oak Ridge National Laboratory.9 After imposing the 1% or less urban area requirement to
identify rural counties, rural counties with mountainous terrain are placed in the control
group. This control group consists of counties predominately in Montana, Wyoming,
Colorado, Utah, Idaho, Oregon, and Washington but also counties in Arizona, New
Mexico, Nebraska, and South Dakota. The results from this alternative
difference-in-difference specification are reported in Panel C of Table 4, and provide further
empirical support for the substitution hypothesis.
Another difference-in-difference test conditions on small versus large increases in
crop insurance from 1994 to 1995 among religious counties. We define religious counties as
those with religious adherence rates above the cross-sectional median in 1990 (last census
before the FCIRA of 1994). Among these religious counties, large (small) increases in crop
insurance between 1994 and 1995 are defined as those above the 75th (below the 25th)
percentile. These increases are attributed to the FCIRA of 1994 and denoted ∆CI.
Intuitively, the control group contains religious counties such as those in Texas where field
crop production is negligible and increases in crop insurance were correspondingly small,
while the treatment group contains religious counties such as those in Kansas where field
crop production is high and increases in crop insurance were correspondingly large. While
a multitude of factors may influence a county’s religiosity, the FCIRA of 1994 targeted crop
insurance, not religious activities. Thus, reverse causality is unlikely to confound our
interpretation of this difference-in-difference methodology.
Panel D of Table 4 provides additional support for the substitution hypothesis since
the δ coefficient in equation (8) with the modified Treated Counties × Post-FCIRA
variable equals -0.035 and is significant at the 5%-level. Thus, among religious counties,
larger increases in crop insurance usage are associated with greater declines in religious
adherence. As expected, the δ coefficient in equation (9) with the modified treatment
9

Terrain data can be downloaded from https://doi.org/10.3334/ORNLDAAC/656.
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variable is positive since the treatment and control groups are partially defined by
differences in crop insurance.
In addition, Appendix C uses the Treated Counties × Post-FCIRA interaction
variable in the first column of Panel A of Table 4 based on the 1% threshold for Agriculture
to examine the FCIRA’s impact on demographic characteristics. This analysis finds that
while the population of rural counties declined post-FCIRA compared to urban counties,
the percentage of their population at or below the age of 40 became higher. Interestingly,
the FCIRA did not induce differences in the other demographic characteristics used as
control variables such as the percentage of the population that are married or
college-educated.
While the FCIRA exerted an insignificant impact on race, marriage, and education,
rural counties became relatively youthful and experienced a relative decline in population
compared to urban counties following this legislation. In particular, both urban and rural
counties aged but urban counties aged more rapidly during our sample period. These
findings are difficult to reconcile with the outward migration of young non-adherents from
rural counties being responsible for the decline in rural religiosity that supports our
substitution hypothesis. More important, such migration would increase rather than
decrease our definition of religious adherence, and therefore bias our results against
supporting the substitution hypothesis. Indeed, additional results in Appendix C confirm
that adding age as a county-level control variable does not alter our empirical support for
the substitution hypothesis.

E

Trends in Religious Adherence
We also address the possibility that a pre-existing trend in religious adherence

before the FCIRA complicates our support for the substitution hypothesis. Specifically,
decreasing religiosity during the 1980s would complicate empirical support for the
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substitution hypothesis based on the subsequent FCIRA of 1994.
Recall that year fixed effects control for national trends. To further examine the
influence of trends, we identify trends in religious adherence before the FCIRA across
different counties. According to the results below, religious adherence in the 1980s
increased, not decreased, in religious counties for both the treatment (Large ∆CI ) and
control (Small ∆CI ) groups underlying the previous difference-in-difference estimation.

∆Adherence
Religious Counties

1980s (Pre-FCIRA)

1990s (FCIRA)

Small ∆CI

0.064

-0.077

Large ∆CI

0.088

-0.124

Difference

0.024***

-0.047***

(0.006)

(0.000)

Following the increasing trend in religiosity during the 1980s, religious adherence
experienced a greater reversal during the 1990s in the treatment group that experienced
larger increases in crop insurance.10 Indeed, the increasing trend in religious adherence
prior to the FCIRA of 1994 was stronger in the treatment group (Large ∆CI ) than the
control group (Small ∆CI ). Overall, trends in religious adherence prior to the FCIRA do
not explain our empirical support for the substitution hypothesis.

F

Additional Support for the Substitution Hypothesis
Several additional tests provide further empirical support for the substitution

hypothesis.
Placebo Tests. For counties where agricultural risk is minimal, crop insurance is not
10

The change in religious adherence from 2000 to 2010 was a negligible -0.002 for counties in the treatment
group.
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predicted to affect local religious adherence. Therefore, we estimate equation (7) in
metropolitan counties and urban counties. Metropolitan counties are defined as those with
a population in the top decile of all U.S. counties.11 Urban counties are defined as those
where Agriculture is in the bottom 5% of all U.S. counties. Within these two subsets, Panel
A in Table 5 reports no inverse relation between the use of crop insurance and religious
adherence. Specifically, the coefficients in both metropolitan and urban counties for
Finance are statistically insignificant. Therefore, the placebo tests find no substitution
effect in counties where no substitution effect is predicted.
Counties Unaffected by the Great Flood. Natural disasters such as floods can affect
religiosity (Sinding Bentzen (2019), Pargament (2001)). In our context, the religiosity of
households that experienced the Great Flood of 1993 may have changed as a result of this
natural disaster instead of the FCIRA of 1994. To isolate the FCIRA’s impact on
religiosity, we examine counties that were unaffected by the Great Flood. As federal
legislation, the FCIRA applies to all U.S. counties, both those affected and unaffected by
the Great Flood.12 Therefore, we re-estimate equation (7) with only counties unaffected by
the Great Flood. According to Panel A of Table 5, the coefficient from equation (7) for
Finance in these unaffected counties is −0.051, which is statistically significant at the
1%-level and larger than its counterpart from the full sample. Social stress or a loss of faith
due to the Great Flood is unlikely to explain this result. Instead, the reduction in religious
adherence in the unaffected counties is consistent with the substitution hypothesis.
Change on Change Regression. Our study does not attempt to explain
cross-sectional county-level differences in religiosity that can arise from observed as well as
unobserved historical, social, political, and economic factors. Instead, our goal is to
11

Similar results are obtained if metropolitan counties are defined as those with a population above 200,000.
The counties unaffected by the Great Flood of 1994 are those not located in the following states: North
Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, Wisconsin, and Illinois.
12
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understand whether the increased use of financial contracts to manage household risk,
specifically crop insurance, explains variation in religious adherence. In other words, we do
not intend to explain differences in religiosity between counties, but explain changes in
religiosity within these counties during the 1990s as a result of the FCIRA of 1994. Thus,
the focus of our empirical strategy is to study changes in religious adherence and crop
insurance around this legislation. The following change on change regression from 1990 to
2000 facilitates a direct test of these changes.

(10)

∆Adherencei = β1 ∆Financei + β2 ∆Agriculturei + γ ∆Xi + i .

In the above specification, the change in religious adherence (∆Adherence) is the
dependent variable and the change in the percentage of insured acres (∆Finance) is the
independent variable of primary interest. Although households in certain counties may be
reluctant to increase their use of crop insurance (due to their innate conservatism for
example), this reluctance would not induce spurious support for the substitution
hypothesis since equation (10) conditions on changes in crop insurance usage.
According to Panel B of Table 5, the coefficient for ∆Finance in the full
specification is −0.043 and statistically significant at the 1%-level. This change on change
regression result confirms that increased crop insurance usage is associated with a decline
in religious adherence between 1990 and 2000.
Spatial First Difference Analysis. The Spatial First Difference (SFD) is a novel
cross-sectional research design that detects causal effects in the presence of omitted
variables using neighboring units of observation (Druckenmiller and Hsiang (2018)). This
approach, which is ideally suited for county-level studies, assumes that neighboring
counties are comparable. Intuitively, two neighboring counties have common characteristics
and are more similar than two otherwise random counties. By restricting comparisons to
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neighboring counties, the influence of omitted variables regarding local climate, political,
and economic conditions are controlled for by the SFD methodology, thereby allowing us to
determine whether a change in financial contracting causes a change in religious adherence.
The SFD methodology is similar to the previous change on change regression in equation
(10), except that the ∆ operator applies to the difference between neighboring counties
instead of differences over time.
To implement the SFD methodology, we use a shapefile for all US counties obtained
from ESRI, an international supplier of geographic information system software, and adopt
the replication codes from the Global Policy Lab provided by Druckenmiller and Hsiang
(2018). The results from the SFD estimation in Panel B of Table 5 confirm the
substitution hypothesis as crop insurance exerts a negative impact on religious adherence.
In particular, the coefficient for ∆Finance in the full specification is −0.020 and
statistically significant at the 5%-level.
Church Donations. In addition to religious adherence, we examine an alternative
measure of religiosity based on church donations. Time-series variation in church donations
allows us to measure declines in religiosity that occur before church members declare
themselves unaffiliated with any congregation in the next census. Annual donation data is
obtained from the Presbyterian church over the 1994 to 1998 subperiod.13 In this sample,
the average annual donation per congregation member is $557.
The availability of annual donation data between 1994 and 1998 enables us to study
the immediate impact exerted by the FCIRA of 1994 using the following
difference-in-difference methodology.

(11) Donationi,t = β Agriculturei,t + δ Treated Countiesi × Post-FCIRAi,t + γ Xi,t + i,t .
13

Hungerman (2005) contains a detailed description of the donation data.
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Consistent with our earlier support for the substitution hypothesis and the empirical
evidence in Auriol et al. (2020) that finds an insurance motive for donations to religous
institutions, the coefficient for the Treated Counties × Post-FCIRA variable in Panel C of
Table 5 is negative for every specification and significant at the 1%-level. The most
conservative point estimate (-36.518) indicates that doubling crop insurance usage is
associated with a $37 decrease in the average donation by those who continue to be
congregation members.
Finally, in an unreported robustness test, we use Canadian census data to examine
religious adherence during the 1990s in three Canadian provinces (Manitoba,
Saskatchewan, and Alberta) that have significant field crop production. Canadian farmers
have been covered by a comprehensive crop insurance program since 1959 and were not
affected by the FCIRA of 1994. In contrast to our evidence in the United States, we find a
slight increase in religious adherence during the 1990s in the three Canadian provinces.
Therefore, this placebo test finds no substitution effect where no substitution effect is
predicted.

V

Economic Consequences
This section studies the implications of financial contracting for traditional risk

management mechanisms other than informal risk-sharing agreements facilitated by
religious adherence. These alternative mechanisms are precautionary savings and crop
diversification. We also examine whether crop insurance usage affects agricultural
productivity defined by crop yields.

30

A

Precautionary Savings
According to Rampini and Viswanathan (2017), the high cost of using financial

contracts to insure consumption against income shocks leads households to rely on
precautionary savings. We examine whether precautionary savings is reduced by crop
insurance in the following panel regression where annual county-level bank deposits
(logged) between 1994 and 2000 proxy for precautionary savings.

(12)

log(Bank Deposits)i,t = β1 Financei,t + β2 Agriculturei,t + γ Xi,t + i,t .

County and year fixed effects are included in this specification along with county
characteristics. Equation (12) is also estimated with the number of bank branches in a
county as the dependent variable. Bank deposit and branch data is obtained from the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. In addition, we compute two normalized
dependent variables, per capita bank deposits and bank branches per 1,000 inhabitants, for
use as dependent variables in equation (12).
Table 6 provides evidence that crop insurance displaced precautionary savings.
Specifically, the negative β1 coefficients for Finance across the four proxies indicate that
precautionary savings in agricultural counties was displaced by crop insurance. This
displacement confirms the importance of crop insurance to household risk management and
provides further support for the substitution hypothesis.

B

Crop Diversification and Moral Hazard
While precautionary savings is a response to agricultural risk and investment

opportunities, crop diversification is a determinant of agricultural risk. Thus, the impact of
the substitution hypothesis on moral hazard can be directly examined using crop
diversification. In comparison to crop insurance, disaster assistance is less susceptible to
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moral hazard due to its dependence on exogenous natural disasters.
Crop diversification has a central role in the management of agricultural risk that
parallels its importance in finance. For example, medieval farmers diversified their
production by “strip farming”, that is cultivating multiple land plots in different locations
(Desai (2017)). In the modern era, crop diversification has been found to increase
agricultural productivity and lower agricultural risk.14
We examine the impact of crop insurance on two county-level proxies for crop
diversification; a Crop Herfindahl Index and the average Number of Crops grown. Our
analysis of crop diversification estimates equation (7) with both these proxies as the
dependent variable. Furthermore, although crop diversification preserves soil quality and
lowers agricultural risk, a reduction in crop diversification may be justified if agricultural
productivity improves as a result of specialization. Therefore, we also estimate equation (7)
with average crop yields per acre across the six field crops as the dependent variable to
determine whether the increased use of crop insurance affected productivity.
The results in Panel A of Table 7 indicate that the increased use of crop insurance
usage reduced crop diversification, especially in counties that experienced large decreases in
religious adherence. Moreover, Panel B of Table 7 indicates that the increased use of crop
insurance generally decreased crop yields. Consequently, the increased use of crop insurance
was not associated with an increase in agricultural productivity due to specialization.
In conjunction, the reductions in crop diversification and crop yields are consistent
with moral hazard since the reduction in crop diversification increased risk without
increasing productivity. Furthermore, consistent with a decline in effort being responsible
for the decline in crop productivity, Appendix C provides evidence that the FCIRA of 1994
reduced employment in the farm sector. Overall, our results indicate that the displacement
of informal risk sharing within a social network by a formal insurance contract has negative
14

The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.
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implications for traditional risk management mechanisms and productivity.
Intuitively, the use of crop insurance allowed farmers to reduce the effort and
expenditures required to diversify crops as well as the effort and expenditures required to
maintain high agricultural productivity.15 As monitoring and information sharing within
church congregations can alleviate moral hazard, the displacement of religious adherence by
crop insurance offers an explanation for the associated reductions in crop diversification
and crop yields. The results in Table 7 support this explanation since decreases in crop
diversification parallel decreases in religious adherence.

C

Consumption Implications
A reduction in income risk without a corresponding reduction in income may

increase consumption as precautionary savings becomes less important. Our substitution
hypothesis also suggests that consumption related to social activities may decrease relative
to non-social activities as informal social contracts become less important for household
risk management.
Detailed state-level consumption data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis begins
in 1997, after the FCIRA of 1994. Nevertheless, this data indicates that average household
consumption increased every year from $19,966 in 1997 to $20,927 in 1998, $22,123 in 1999,
and $23,498 in 2000. These consumption increases average $1,177, which is large compared
to the previously reported declines in bank deposits and church donations whose
approximate magnitudes are -$1,510 and -$36.50, respectively. However, uncompensated
time commitments required by religious activities are more relevant to our study of
household risk management than the explicit financial cost of religious adherence. In
particular, dollar-denominated church donations may be less consequential than the
15

For example, Smith and Goodwin (1996) report that crop insurance reduced crop yields by lowering
fertilizer usage.
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implicit costs of demonstrating commitment to a social contract that facilitates risk sharing
and rendering assistance to members of the social contract in need.16
To distinguish between social and non-social consumption, we define spending on
recreational services and food services as social consumption since these consumption
categories often involve members of different households. In contrast, we define spending
on financial services, healthcare, transportation (including travel), motor vehicles, and
home furnishings as non-social consumption since these consumption categories are more
likely intended to pertain to members of an individual household.
Consistent with the argument that increased consumption results from a reduction
in income risk, the increased use of crop insurance is associated with higher total
consumption. In particular, Table 8 indicates that increased crop insurance usage is
positively associated with spending on non-social consumption. In addition, households
appear to have re-allocated precautionary savings to other financial services.
Although declining participation in religious activities could increase participation
in other social activities, our empirical results suggest a positive relation between
participation in religious and social activities in general. This positive relation suggests
that declines in religious adherence are likely to be mirrored by declines in less stringent
“recreational” social networks that are less adept at facilitating risk sharing.
Overall, despite being limited to state-level post-FCIRA consumption data, we find
suggestive evidence that declines in church donations, precautionary savings, and income
risk lead to higher consumption. Specifically, our evidence suggests that increased crop
insurance usage (decreased income risk) is associated with higher non-social consumption
involving healthcare, financial services, travel, motor vehicles, and home furnishings but
lower social consumption involving recreational services and food services. Consequently,
16

For example, participating in religious activities for 3 hours per week at $20 per hour leads to an annual
$3,120 cost. Incurring this high cost may be necessary to mitigate much larger negative income shocks
imposed by agricultural risk.
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our support for the substitution hypothesis based on religiosity likely applies more broadly
to participation in other social networks.
Nevertheless, Chetty and Looney (2006) caution that consumption alone is
insufficient to understand the risk management decisions of farmers since farmers often
smooth their consumption by altering their labor supply (Kochar (1999), Cameron and
Worswick (2003)) in response to agricultural shocks. Besides altering non-farm
employment, Rosenzweig and Stark (1989) link marriage and migration patterns to
consumption smoothing in agricultural communities as marriage to geographically distant
partners improves income diversification within extended families. Hess (2004) examines
the general use of marriage to smooth consumption. Overall, increased consumption is not
the only response to reduced income risk. Instead, the displacement of informal social
contracts that manage income risk by formal insurance contracts can increase leisure,
decrease the supply of labor, and lead to marriage being deferred.

VI

Conclusion
We examine household risk management decisions regarding the use of formal

financial contracts and traditional yet informal risk-sharing agreements. We find evidence
that households in agricultural communities use religious adherence to manage their
exposure to agricultural risk. More important, after an exogenous reduction in the cost of
crop insurance due to government subsidies, we find that increased crop insurance usage
lead to a decrease in religious adherence. Therefore, our results indicate that households
replaced informal risk sharing facilitated by religious adherence with a formal financial
contract (insurance) when the financial contract became less costly. This substitution is
consistent with a cost-benefit analysis determining household participation in social
networks that facilitate risk sharing.
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The increased use of crop insurance also displaced traditional risk management
mechanisms such as precautionary savings and crop diversification. Moreover, consistent
with an increase in moral hazard, the increased use of crop insurance decreased agricultural
productivity. Thus, our results contribute to our understanding of household risk
management and public policy debates regarding the role of government and finance in
society.
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Figure 1: County-Level Variation Across Changes in Crop Insurance
Panel A: Percentage change in crop insurance usage from 1994 to 1995 by county
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Panel B: Histogram of changes in crop insurance usage from 1994 to 1995
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This figure illustrates county-level variation in the use of crop insurance between 1994 and
1995 due to the Federal Crop Insurance Reform Act of 1994.

40

Figure 2: Agriculture and Religious Adherence
Religious Adherence
65%

60%

55%

50%

45%
Low Agriculture

High Agriculture

This figure illustrates the county-level relation between agricultural intensity and religious
adherence (defined as the number of religious adherents in a county divided by the county’s
population) based on census data from 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2010.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
The table below provides summary statistics between 1980 and 2010 for the county-level variables
used to empirically test our substitution hypothesis. Appendix A contains a description of these variables.
Panel A and Panel B are based on annual county-level observations, while Panel C is based on county-level
observations from the 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2010 census.

Panel A: Agriculture

Agriculture
Soil Quality

N
74,072
72,759

Mean
24%
13.15

Std. Dev.
25%
7.10

5%
0%
3.00

Median
13%
12.00

95%
74%
26.00

N
69,491
69,491

Mean
61,922
47%

Std. Dev.
105,000
36%

5%
178
1%

Median
18,949
42%

95%
255,000
100%

N
10,069
10,069
10,068
10,069

Mean
36,594
56%
306
81

Std. Dev.
128,000
18%
199
129

5%
1,897
29%
115
12

Median
12,445
55%
250
50

95%
135,000
88%
679
235

Panel B: Financial Contracting

Insured Acreage
Finance
Panel C: Religiosity

Number of Religious Adherents
Religious Adherence
Number of Congregation Members
Number of Congregations
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Table 2: Agricultural Risk and Religious Adherence
This table reports the results from the panel regression in equation (6) using 1990 and 2000 census
data. The dependent variable is religious adherence at the county level. Year fixed effects are included
to absorb any trend in religious adherence across the United States. County fixed effects are included to
account for variation in religious adherence across counties and determine whether changes in agricultural
activity induce changes in religious adherence. Standard errors are clustered by county. The county
characteristics include population and per capita income as well as the percentage of the population that
is college educated, foreign born, married, and African American since these demographic variables may
be correlated with religious adherence and agricultural production. To obtain the time series R-squared,
we first regress religious adherence on county fixed effects and then use the residuals from this regression
as the dependent variable. Standard errors are White (1980) heteroskedasticity-robust. ***, **,* represents
statistical significance (different from zero) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

Agriculture
County Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects
County Characteristics
Observations
R-squared
Time Series R-squared

All Counties
0.541*** 0.477***
(0.082)
(0.083)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
5,142
5,142
0.913
0.915
0.269
0.293

Poor Soil
0.624***
(0.128)
Yes
Yes
Yes
2,675
0.894
0.390
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Good Soil
0.099
(0.087)
Yes
Yes
Yes
2,467
0.943
0.180

Table 3: Substitution Hypothesis
Panel A of this table reports on the relation between the use of crop insurance (Finance) and
religious adherence (Adherence) based on the panel regression in equation (7), Adherencei,t =
β1 Financei,t + β2 Agriculturei,t + γ Xi,t + i,t . The sample period is based on the census in 1990
and 2000. Good Soil (Poor Soil) refers to counties with above-median (below-median) soil quality measured
by available water storage. County and year fixed effects are included in each specification, with standard
errors clustered by county. The county characteristics in X include population and per capita income
as well as the percentage of the county’s population that is college educated, foreign born, married, and
African American. To obtain the time series R-squared, we first regress religious adherence on county
fixed effects and then use the residuals from this regression as the dependent variable. In Panel B, the
Agriculture control variable (percentage of land area in a county cultivated with field crops) is replaced with
county-level Farm Employment, the percentage of employment involved in farming activities, as a proxy for
agricultural intensity, hence agricultural risk. Panel C reports the effect of crop insurance on the average
number of members in a church congregation and the number of congregations, both in logs. Standard
errors are White (1980) heteroskedasticity-robust. ***, **,* represents statistical significance (different
from zero) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

Panel A: Effect of Crop Insurance on Religious Adherence

Finance

-0.068***
(0.015)

Agriculture

All Counties
-0.049*** -0.044***
(0.015)
(0.015)
0.468***
0.412***
(0.084)
(0.084)

Finance × Soil Quality
County Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects
County Characteristics
Observations
R-squared
Time Series R-squared

Yes
Yes
No
5,002
0.910
0.264

Yes
Yes
No
5,002
0.912
0.285

Yes
Yes
Yes
5,002
0.915
0.307
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-0.128***
(0.020)
0.348***
(0.083)
0.094***
(0.016)
Yes
Yes
Yes
4,915
0.918
0.343

Poor Soil
-0.047**
(0.020)
0.524***
(0.134)

Good Soil
-0.005
(0.022)
0.097
(0.087)

Yes
Yes
Yes
2,570
0.892
0.405

Yes
Yes
Yes
2,432
0.943
0.189

Panel B: Agriculture Defined by Employment in Farming

Finance

-0.068***
(0.015)

Farm Employment

All Counties
-0.069*** -0.060***
(0.015)
(0.015)
0.422***
0.393***
(0.149)
(0.145)

Finance × Soil Quality
County Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects
County Characteristics
Observations
R-squared
Time Series R-squared

Yes
Yes
No
5,002
0.910
0.264

Yes
Yes
No
4,965
0.911
0.272

Yes
Yes
Yes
4,965
0.915
0.302

-0.086***
(0.016)
0.409***
(0.144)
0.103***
(0.016)
Yes
Yes
Yes
4,878
0.918
0.331

Poor Soil
-0.067***
(0.019)
0.611**
(0.251)

Good Soil
-0.009
(0.022)
0.429***
(0.152)

Yes
Yes
Yes
2,535
0.892
0.400

Yes
Yes
Yes
2,430
0.944
0.201

Panel C: Effect of Crop Insurance on Church Congregations

Finance
Agriculture
County Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects
County Characteristics
Observations
R-squared
Time Series R-squared

Number of Congregation Members
All Counties
Poor Soil Good Soil
-0.055*
-0.071***
-0.072**
-0.007
(0.028)
(0.027)
(0.035)
(0.042)
0.676*** 0.800***
1.004***
0.249
(0.169)
(0.165)
(0.268)
(0.162)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
5,002
5,002
2,570
2,432
0.965
0.968
0.963
0.976
0.088
0.162
0.258
0.097
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Number of Congregations
All Counties
Poor Soil Good Soil
0.003
-0.023
-0.031
-0.006
(0.017) (0.015)
(0.020)
(0.023)
-0.187** -0.013
-0.001
-0.049
(0.084) (0.080)
(0.128)
(0.101)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
5,002
5,002
2,570
2,432
0.995
0.996
0.996
0.997
0.042
0.215
0.229
0.199

Table 4: Difference-in-Difference Methodology
Panel A of the table reports the results from the difference-in-difference methodology in equations
(8) and (9) that exploits cross-sectional variation across rural versus urban counties and time-series variation
before versus after the FCIRA of 1994. The sample period involves census data from 1980, 1990, 2000,
and 2010. In urban counties, the fraction of total land area under cultivation by field crops, Agriculture,
is required to be below a specified threshold that ranges from 1% to 5%. The difference-in-difference
methodology accounts for trends affecting religious adherence in urban counties and rural counties before
the FCIRA of 1994 by creating a county-year Treated Countiesi × Post-FCIRAi,t variable defined as
the product of a post-1995 indicator and a rural (non-urban) indicator. Panel B reports results after
pre-selecting rural counties as those with 1% or less of their land area being urban according to the U.S.
Census. The Agriculture thresholds then determine which rural counties are exposed to the agricultural
risk of field crop production. Rural counties with minimal field crop production are assigned to the control
group. Among pre-selected rural counties, Panel C uses a county’s terrain to determine its exposure to
agricultural risk, with mountainous rural counties assigned to the control group. Panel D reports the results
from a modified methodology involving census data from 1990 and 2000 that conditions on cross-sectional
variation across large versus small increases in crop insurance from 1994 to 1995 within religious counties.
Religious counties have Adherence rates above the county-level median in 1990, while the 75th and 25th
percentiles of changes in crop insurance between 1994 and 1995 define large and small increases, respectively.
The indicator for large (small) increases in crop insurance then defines the treatment (control) group. The
county characteristics include population and per capita income as well as the percentage of the county’s
population that is college educated, foreign born, married, and African American. To obtain the time series
R-squared, we first regress religious adherence on county fixed effects and then use the residuals from this
regression as the dependent variable. ***, **,* represents statistical significance (different from zero) at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

Panel A: Variation Across Urban and Rural Counties

% of Counties in Control Group
Treated Counties × Post-FCIRA
Agriculture
County Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects
County Characteristics
Observations
R-squared
Time Series R-squared

Religious Adherence
Urban Counties with Agriculture below
1%
2%
5%
13.5%
20.0%
33.0%

Crop Insurance Usage
Urban Counties with Agriculture below
1%
2%
5%
13.5%
20.0%
33.0%

-0.020***
(0.007)
-0.000
(0.023)
Yes
Yes
Yes
10,054
0.874
0.221

0.069***
(0.015)
-0.375***
(0.027)
Yes
Yes
Yes
69,476
0.846
0.794

-0.014**
(0.006)
-0.000
(0.023)
Yes
Yes
Yes
10,054
0.874
0.220
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-0.014**
(0.006)
-0.000
(0.023)
Yes
Yes
Yes
10,054
0.874
0.220

0.050***
(0.012)
-0.373***
(0.027)
Yes
Yes
Yes
69,476
0.845
0.794

0.048***
(0.009)
-0.373***
(0.027)
Yes
Yes
Yes
69,476
0.846
0.794

Panel B: Variation Across Rural Counties

% of Counties in Control Group
Treated Counties × Post-FCIRA
Agriculture
County Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects
County Characteristics
Observations
R-squared
Time Series R-squared

Religious Adherence
Rural Counties with Agriculture below
1%
2%
5%
14.7%
21.5%
33.5%

Crop Insurance Usage
Rural Counties with Agriculture below
1%
2%
5%
14.7%
21.5%
33.5%

-0.029***
(0.011)
0.021
(0.030)
Yes
Yes
Yes
5,201
0.871
0.220

0.088***
(0.019)
-0.241***
(0.032)
Yes
Yes
Yes
35,824
0.846
0.793

-0.028***
(0.009)
0.019
(0.030)
Yes
Yes
Yes
5,201
0.872
0.221

-0.021***
(0.008)
0.020
(0.029)
Yes
Yes
Yes
5,201
0.871
0.220

Panel C: Terrain Variation Across Rural Counties

% of Counties in Control Group
Treated Counties × Post-FCIRA
Agriculture
County Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects
County Characteristics
Observations
R-squared
Time Series R-squared

Religious Adherence
3.58%

Crop Insurance Usage
3.58%

-0.068***
(0.014)
0.024
(0.030)
Yes
Yes
Yes
5,228
0.873
0.223

0.120***
(0.032)
-0.243***
(0.032)
Yes
Yes
Yes
35,824
0.845
0.793

Panel D: Variation in Crop Insurance Usage Across Religious Counties
Religious Adherence
Treated Counties × Post-FCIRA
Agriculture
County Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects
County Characteristics
Observations
R-squared
Time Series R-squared

-0.035**
(0.014)
0.341**
(0.146)
Yes
Yes
Yes
1,209
0.822
0.518
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Crop Insurance Usage
0.299***
(0.028)
-1.233***
(0.244)
Yes
Yes
Yes
1,204
0.887
0.803

0.079***
(0.015)
-0.239***
(0.032)
Yes
Yes
Yes
35,824
0.846
0.794

0.063***
(0.012)
-0.242***
(0.032)
Yes
Yes
Yes
35,824
0.846
0.794

Table 5: Additional Support for the Substitution Hypothesis
Panel A reports the results from the panel regression in equation (7) for metropolitan counties, urban counties, and counties unaffected by the Great Flood of 1993. Metropolitan counties are defined as
those with a population in the top decile of all counties and urban counties are defined as those with
an Agriculture measure in the bottom 5% of all counties. County and year fixed effects are included in
both specifications, with standard errors clustered by county. County Characteristics include population
and per capita income as well as the percentage of the county’s population that is college educated,
foreign born, married, and African American. To obtain the time series R-squared, we first regress
religious adherence on county fixed effects and then use the residuals from this regression as the dependent
variable. Panel B reports the results from the change on change regression in equation (10). The
dependent variable in this specification involves the change in religious adherence between 1990 and 2000,
∆Adherencei = β1 ∆Financei + β2 ∆Agriculturei + γ ∆Xi + i . The independent variables are also defined
according to their respective change from 1990 to 2000. During the same decade, Panel B also reports the
results from a Spatial First Difference procedure based on neighboring counties. Panel C reports the results
from the difference-in-difference methodology in equation (11) for church donations. Standard errors are
White (1980) heteroskedasticity-robust. ***, **,* represents statistical significance (different from zero) at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

Panel A: County Subsets

Finance
Agriculture
County Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects
County Characteristics
Observations
R-squared
Time Series R-squared

Metropolitan Counties with
High Population
0.038
(0.037)
-0.205
(0.232)
Yes
Yes
Yes
479
0.928
0.483

Urban Counties with
Low Agriculture
0.166
(0.291)
32.809
(177.151)
Yes
Yes
Yes
177
0.979
0.749

Counties Unaffected
by the Great Flood
-0.051***
(0.017)
0.453***
(0.116)
Yes
Yes
Yes
3,474
0.897
0.343

Panel B: Alternative Econometric Procedures

Change in Finance
Change in Agriculture
Change in County Characteristics
Observations
R-squared / Psuedo R-squared

Change on Change Regression
-0.068*** -0.048*** -0.043***
(0.010)
(0.010)
(0.010)
0.469***
0.413***
(0.057)
(0.058)
No
No
Yes
2,360
2,360
2,360
0.022
0.050
0.078
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Spatial First Difference
-0.033*** -0.021** -0.020**
(0.009)
(0.008)
(0.008)
0.232*** 0.207***
(0.052)
(0.052)
No
No
Yes
2,356
2,356
2,356
0.009
0.05
0.089

Panel C: Difference-in-Difference for Donations

% of Urban Counties in the Sample
Treated Counties × Post-FCIRA
Agriculture
County Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects
County Characteristics
Observations
R-squared

Donation per Congregation Member
Urban Counties with Agriculture below
1%
2%
5%
9.2%
14.8%
25.7%
-37.834**
(18.260)
-71.360***
(20.736)
Yes
Yes
Yes
13,302
0.145

-37.240**
(14.575)
-63.677***
(21.198)
Yes
Yes
Yes
13,302
0.145
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-36.518***
(12.681)
-50.841**
(20.570)
Yes
Yes
Yes
13,302
0.145

Table 6: Precautionary Savings
This table reports the results from an empirical test that replaces the dependent variable in equation (7) with four annual county-level proxies for precautionary savings available from the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation. County and year fixed effects are included in all specifications, with standard
errors clustered by county. County Characteristics include population and per capita income as well as
the percentage of the county’s population that is college educated, foreign born, married, and African
American. To obtain the time series R-squared, we first regress religious adherence on county fixed effects
and then use the residuals from this regression as the dependent variable. Standard errors are White (1980)
heteroskedasticity-robust. ***, **,* represents statistical significance (different from zero) at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% levels, respectively.

Finance
Agriculture
County Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects
County Characteristics
Observations
R-squared
Time Series R-squared

Log(Deposits)
-0.070***
(0.020)
-0.116***
(0.036)
Yes
Yes
Yes
18,428
0.989
0.606

Log(Branches)
-0.054***
(0.020)
-0.086**
(0.041)
Yes
Yes
Yes
18,428
0.985
0.153
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Deposits
per capita
-1.510***
(0.255)
-2.532***
(0.709)
Yes
Yes
Yes
18,428
0.929
0.625

Branches per
1,000 inhabitants
-0.021**
(0.010)
-0.031
(0.025)
Yes
Yes
Yes
18,428
0.954
0.099

Table 7: Crop Diversification and Crop Yields
Panel A of this table reports results from an empirical test that replaces the dependent variable in
equation (7) with two county-level annual proxies for crop diversification; a Crop Herfindahl Index and
the average Number of Crops grown. Panel B reports the impact of crop insurance on agricultural
productivity by estimating equation (7) with average crop yields per acre as the dependent variable.
County and year fixed effects are included in both specifications, with standard errors clustered by county.
County Characteristics include population and per capita income as well as the percentage of the county’s
population that is college educated, foreign born, married, and African American. To obtain the time series
R-squared, we first regress religious adherence on county fixed effects and then use the residuals from this
regression as the dependent variable. Standard errors are White (1980) heteroskedasticity-robust. ***, **,*
represents statistical significance (different from zero) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

Panel A: Crop Diversification

Finance
Agriculture
County Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects
County Characteristics
Observations
R-squared
Time Series R-squared

All
Counties
0.027***
(0.007)
-0.045*
(0.025)
Yes
Yes
Yes
36,836
0.804
0.168

Crop Herfindahl Index
Decline in Religious Adherence
High
Low
0.050***
0.007
(0.010)
(0.010)
-0.115***
-0.003
(0.037)
(0.034)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
36,836
17,075
0.796
0.787
0.182
0.184

All
Counties
-0.447***
(0.084)
1.688***
(0.213)
Yes
Yes
Yes
36,836
0.796
0.449

Number of Crops
Decline in Religious Adherence
High
Low
-0.689***
-0.259**
(0.126)
(0.107)
2.901***
0.636**
(0.284)
(0.278)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
19,761
17,075
0.812
0.778
0.448
0.467

Panel B: Crop Yields

Finance
Agriculture
County Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects
County Characteristics
Crop Fixed Effects
Observations
R-squared

All Crops
-0.021***
(0.008)
0.034
(0.024)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
142,867
0.790

Corn
-0.016
(0.014)
-0.195***
(0.038)
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
33,765
0.715

Soybeans
0.006
(0.012)
-0.106***
(0.031)
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
31,358
0.686
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Wheat
-0.034***
(0.010)
0.173***
(0.034)
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
31,117
0.681

Oats
0.045***
(0.017)
0.290***
(0.055)
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
20,975
0.528

Sorghum
-0.045**
(0.019)
-0.044
(0.055)
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
15,540
0.676

Barley
-0.103***
(0.019)
0.088
(0.072)
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
10,112
0.621

Table 8: Consumption
This table reports results from regressing social consumption and non-social consumption categories
on crop insurance usage. State-level consumption data is collected from the Bureau of Economic Analysis
between 1997 and 2010. Social consumption consists of recreational services and food services, while
non-social consumption consists of health services, financial services, transportation services (travel), motor
vehicles, and furnishings. Each of these consumption categories replace the dependent variable in equation
(7). State and year fixed effects are included in both specifications, with standard errors clustered by state.
State characteristics include population and per capita income as well as the percentage of the state’s
population that is college educated, foreign born, married, and African American. Standard errors are
White (1980) heteroskedasticity-robust. ***, **,* represents statistical significance (different from zero) at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

Finance
Agriculture
State Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects
State Characteristics
Observations

Total
Consumption
1,132.22***
(401.57)
-9,543.25***
(3,015.27)
Yes
Yes
Yes
578

Social Consumption
Recreation
Food
-126.093*** -82.986***
(33.378)
(22.195)
-32.963
-813.704
(1,030.753)
(685.390)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
578
578
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Health
138.98*
(75.55)
-2,905.64***
(567.29)
Yes
Yes
Yes
578

Non-Social Consumption
Financial
Transport
Motor
279.17***
56.24**
128.35***
(82.57)
(23.06)
(35.72)
-1,257.53**
-151.26
-741.26***
(619.98)
(173.16)
(268.22)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
578
578
578

Furnishings
48.97**
(24.43)
-638.53***
(183.47)
Yes
Yes
Yes
578

Appendix A: Variable Description

Total Acres

Number of acres in the county

Agriculture

Number of acres cultivated by field crops divided by total acres

Soil Quality

Available water storage capacity of the soil

Insured Acres

Number of cultivated acres with crop insurance

Finance

Insured acres divided by acres cultivated by field crops

Number of Religious Adherents

Number of religious adherents across all Christian denominations

Religious Adherence

Number of religious adherents divided by population

Number of Congregation Members

Number of religious adherents divided by number of congregations

Crop Herfindahl

Herfindahl index based on acres cultivated with six different field crops

Number of Crops

Number of different field crops cultivated

Income

Per capita personal income

College Degree

Percentage of population with a college degree

Foreign Born

Percentage of population born in a foreign country

Married

Percentage of adult population that is married

African American

Percentage of the population that is African American
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Appendix B: Distributed Lags Model
Extending equation (7) to include five additional lags for Finance leads to the
following panel regression

Adherencei,t = β0 Financei,t + β1 Financei,t−1 + β2 Financei,t−2 + β3 Financei,t−3 + β4 Financei,t−4
(13)

+β5 Financei,t−5 + α Agriculturei,t + γ Xi,t + i,t .

This panel regression is estimated using annual data between 1990 and 2000, with
interpolation providing the dependent variable. As in the original estimation of equation
(7), X represents county-level characteristics. County and year fixed effects are also
included. This extension recognizes that the use of financial contracting to manage
household risk may induce a gradual substitution away from social networks that facilitate
risk sharing. The results from estimating equation (13) are reported below
β0

-0.025***

-0.014***

(0.004)

(0.003)

β1

-0.020***
(0.002)

β2

-0.012***
(0.002)

β3

-0.006***
(0.002)

β4

-0.006***
(0.002)

β5

-0.004
(0.003)

α

0.127***

0.129***

(0.024)

(0.024)

Observations

26,605

25,347

R-squared

0.961

0.961
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The negative β0 , β1 , β2 , β3 , and β4 coefficients along with the insignificant β5
coefficient indicate that the use of financial contracting to manager risk leads households to
gradually substitute away from informal risk sharing over a four-year horizon. Indeed, the
displacement of social networks is attributable largely to the use of crop insurance in the
prior year.
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Appendix C: Demographic Implications of the FCIRA
The results from a difference-in-difference methodology that examines the relative
impact of the FCIRA on rural versus urban counties using the Treated Counties ×
Post-FCIRA interaction variable in the first column (1% Agriculture threshold) of Panel A
of Table 4 are reported below

Total

Average

Black

Population

Age

Youthfulness

-0.002

0.000

-0.091***

-0.774***

0.015***

(0.002)

(0.002)

(0.001)

(0.015)

(0.097)

(0.002)

0.014***

-0.037***

0.020***

0.000

0.048

0.915***

-0.026***

(0.004)

(0.007)

(0.006)

(0.005)

(0.042)

(0.289)

(0.006)

County Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

County Characteristics

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations

10,054

10,054

10,054

10,054

10,054

10,032

10,032

R-squared

0.944

0.873

0.918

0.991

0.994

0.954

0.954

Treated Counties × Post-FCIRA

Agriculture

College

Foreign

Educated

Born

Married

0.002

0.001

(0.001)

These results indicate that relative to urban counties, rural counties experienced a
decline in population following the FCIRA. This decline in population was accompanied by
a decrease in their average age and corresponding increase in youthfulness defined as the
percentage of a county’s population at or below the age of 40 years. However, the FCIRA
did not induce differences between urban and rural counties in any of the other
demographic characteristics.
An additional analysis supplements the results in Panel A of Table 3 by including
county-level average age as a control variable. The results below indicate that the addition
of age does not weaken our empirical support for the substitution hypothesis.
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All Counties

Poor Soil

Good Soil

-0.042***

-0.045**

0.001

(0.015)

(0.020)

(0.022)

0.010***

0.007

0.016***

(0.004)

(0.006)

(0.004)

0.428***

0.535***

0.124

(0.085)

(0.137)

(0.088)

County Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

County Characteristics

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations

4,991

2,561

2,430

R-squared

0.915

0.892

0.944

Finance

Age

Agriculture

In addition, the results below report a decline in employment in the farming sector
following the FCIRA of 1994. Provided the decline in farm employment results in a
migration of farm labor out of the affected counties, this decline is consistent with the
general decline in population experienced by rural counties post-FCIRA. The decline in
farm employment is also consistent with a reduction in effort explaining the reduction in
field crop productivity reported in Panel B of Table 7.

Percentage of
Employment in Farming
Treated Counties × Post-FCIRA

-242.401***
(35.857)

Agriculture

-34.333
(72.332)

County Fixed Effects

Yes

Year Fixed Effects

Yes

County Characteristics

Yes

Observations

9,992

R-squared

0.962
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